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REALIGNING THE FEDERAL COURT CASELOAD
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing awareness that the federal
judiciary is facing a crisis because of the increasing number of cases it
must handle. This increase in the number of cases filed in federal court
is the result of several factors: federal legislation that has created new
substantive rights,' ambiguous legislation that requires judicial inter-
pretation,2 and increased litigiousness of the public.3 The civil case
backlog problem is further exacerbated by the priority given to crimi-
nal cases by the Speedy Trial Act.4
1. The control of the federal government is expanding into new areas previously left un-
regulated or regulated solely by the states. Concomitant with this expansion, Congress has
passed new legislation that enlarges the federal courts' federal question jurisdiction, thus
increasing the number of cases that may be brought in federal court. See, e.g., Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976); Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-900 (1976); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1976). For a more detailed discussion of how this legislation has effected expanded
federal jurisdiction, see Phillips, The Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction and the Crisis in the
Courts, 31 VAND. L. REv. 17 (1978); Lasker, The Court Crunch.- A Viewfrom the Bench, 76
F.R.D. 245 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lasker]; Wallace, Our Judicial System Needs Help: A
Few Inside Thoughts, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 3, 9 (1977).
Chief Justice Warren Burger has proposed that a judicial impact statement accompany
every piece of legislation that tends to create new cases for the federal courts. Each state-
ment would include an estimate of the number of additional judges and court personnel
required by the legislation. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary 1972, 58 A.B.A.J.
1049, 1050 (1972). Recently $302,000 has been appropriated to Mathtech, of Bethesda, Ma-
ryland, to develop means to determine how legislation impacts on the judiciary. L.A. Daily
J., Oct. 17, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
2. Ambiguous federal legislation requiring court interpretation has also contributed to the
problem of case overload in the federal courts. There are several reasons why ambiguous
legislation is passed: (I) to satisfy competing special interests; (2) to maintain flexibility on
specific issues within regulatory agencies; and (3) to pass responsibility for absolute decisions
to the judiciary, who are not elected and have no constituency to whom they must respond.
See Tyler, Congressional and Executive Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction, 71 F.R.D. 229
(1976).
3. Increased litigation has resulted from a number of socioeconomic changes that have
occurred over the past several decades. With an increase in technology, the wealth of the
nation has increased, communication within the country has greatly improved, and the sense
of neighborhood community has broken down. These in turn have led to a growing ability
of individuals and businesses to afford access to the courts, to rising expectations of the
poorer, more disadvantaged sectors of society, and to an increased propensity to use more
formal means of revolving disputes. Lasker, supra note 1.
4. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976), by requiring trial within
120 days of arrest or indictment, has given priority to criminal cases, thereby drastically
increasing the backlog of civil cases. Lasker, supra note I, at 249; 124 CONG. REC. H726
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (remarks of Adrian Spears, Chief Judge 5th Cir.). The number of
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The scope of the problem is evidenced by caseload statistics.5 As a
result of increased filings, the per-judgeship caseload for the district
courts averaged 432 cases in 1977, compared with 317 in 1970, an in-
crease of 36.3%.6 As a natural consequence of the increased number of
filings in the district courts, the number of appeals to the circuit courts
has also increased.7 The Ninth Circuit alone has a backlog of 4000
appeals, with 800 fully briefed cases waiting to be calendared.8
The burden on the courts gets worse each year, and in the absence of
any positive steps to reduce the number of cases each judge must man-
age, the ability of the federal judiciary to perform its function ade-
quately will be seriously threatened.
The growing awareness of rapidly increasing caseloads in the federal
court system has resulted in a number of proposals for reform. Most of
the means suggested to deal with the overload problem are aimed at
decreasing the district court caseload. Because the number of cases ap-
pealed to the circuit courts is proportional to the number of cases
originally filed in district courts, any proposal that decreases the
number of cases heard in the district courts will also result in a decrease
in the number of cases appealed.
This comment examines legislative and judicial remedies that deal
with the federal caseload problem. First, it examines a set of legislative
proposals aimed primarily at increasing the capacity and efficiency of
the federal courts. Second, it analyzes a set of judicial decisions that
have addressed the problem by imposing requirements that increase
efficiency yet decrease the access to federal courts. Finally, it examines
an additional set of judicial decisions aimed entirely at restricting ac-
cess to the federal courts. It also looks at the legislative action intended
to counter these restrictions.
II. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
As a response to concern about the overload of the federal courts,
pending civil cases has increased 63.3% from 1970 to 1977 as a result of the Act. 124 CONG.
REc. E3792 (daily ed. July 14, 1978) (remarks of Daniel Meador, former U.S. Asst. Atty.
Gen.).
5. In 1977, 172,031 cases were filed in federal court, an increase of 35.2% over the number
of cases filed in 1970. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 113, 115 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
6. Id at 112. During 1977, the United States District Courts had 398 authorized judg-
ships. Id
7. Id at 166.
8. These figures were reported by Chief Judge James R. Browning in a report to the
Federal Bar Association on the state of the Ninth Circuit. L.A. Daily J., Sept. 26, 1978, at 1,
col. 6.
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Congress has introduced legislation that attacks the problem in several
broad areas: by excising large numbers of cases through elimination or
severe curtailment of diversity jurisdiction, by increasing the number of
judges eligible to decide cases, by developing alternative means of dis-
pute resolution, and by developing a means of resolving confficting in-
tercircuit opinions.
A. Diversity
Diversity cases represent a large proportion of the federal court
caseload. 9 Therefore, eliminating or restricting diversity of citizenship
as a basis of federal jurisdiction presents an attractively simple means
of reducing the federal caseload burden.
Federal diversity jurisdiction is authorized in article III, section 2 of
the United States Constitution, which provides for federal jurisdiction
based on "Controversies . . .between Citizens of different States...
and between a State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects."'" It was first enacted in the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
and has been retained as a basis of federal jurisdiction ever since.I
The specific reasons for the inclusion of diversity jurisdiction in the
Constitution are not known.' 2 Scholars, however, generally cite Chief
Justice John Marshall's suggestion that the underlying rationale for di-
versity jurisdiction was to provide a forum for out-of-state litigants in
which they would be protected from the possible prejudice of state
courts.' 3 This has been the traditional explanation for the inclusion of
9. During the judicial year ending June 30, 1977, 130,567 civil cases were commenced. Of
these, 31,678 cases, or 24.3%, were brought under diversity jurisdiction. ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 5, at 317.
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 7.
11. Diversity jurisdiction is currently codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). Section 1332(a)
states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of
a State or of different States.
12. For instance, in THE FEDERALIST, Hamilton said only that cases based on diversity of
citizenship are one of the kinds of cases over which the federal judiciary should have author-
ity. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton).
13. In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809), Marshall
said:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as
impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that
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diversity jurisdiction in the Constitution.'
Valid arguments have been expressed on both sides of the question
of whether diversity jurisdiction should be eliminated. Discussion has
focused on whether bias against out-of-state litigants exists today in
state courts 15 and whether it is still possible to afford litigants in a di-
the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established na-
tional tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or be-
tween citizens of different states.
14. See, e.g., Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 317, 329 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro]. But see Friendly, The Historic Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928), which suggests that there is little actual
historical support for this rationale.
15. The question of the existence of bias against out-of-state litigants in state courts arises
in two contexts: bias resulting from choice of law provisions and bias resulting from local
prejudice as manifested by juries and judges. Proponents of elimination of diversity juris-
diction argue that the danger of prejudice resulting from choice of law provisions no longer
exists. See, e.g., Hunter, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: The Unnecessary Precaution, 46
U.M.K.C. L. REv. 347, 350 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hunter]. Since 1938, the Supreme
Court's decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), has required federal courts to
apply state substantive law in diversity cases. Proponents of elimination of diversity juris-
diction assert that as a result of Erie, an out-of-state litigant is not prejudiced by the substan-
tive law applied in state courts, since the law applied is the same law that would be applied if
the case were brought in federal court. See Hunter, supra, at 350; 124 CONG. REC. H1554
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
Opponents of elimination of diversity jurisdiction do not address this argument, for they
admit that, even before Erie required the application of state substantive law in diversity
cases, state law was a "major source of the rules of decision" on which federal decisions were
based. See Shapiro, supra note 14, at 317. Instead, they focus on the issue of local bias,
which may be present in state court juries and judges. Shapiro points out that, although they
are now drawn from the same'registers as federal juries, state court juries, because they may
be drawn from a smaller geographical area, are likely to be comprised of more provincial
local residents. Id at 330. See also Begam, Should We Remove Diversity Cases from the
Federal Courts?, 61 JUDICATURE 302 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Begam]. However, advo-
cates of elimination of diversity jurisdiction assert that local bias does not exist today be-
cause increased travel and relocation of residences is resulting in a more homogeneous
society. See Hunter, supra, at 349; 124 CONG. REc. H1554 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Kastenmeier); 124 CONG. REc. H1556 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Bennett).
Opponents of elimination of diversity jurisdiction assert that local bias may also affect the
rulings of state court judges. Shapiro, supra note 14, at 330. They concede that the extent of
this bias cannot be measured, since actions of state court judges as well as federal court
judges often occur in private; bias may be manifested only in settlements and nonreviewable
discretionary decisions. Id Proponents of elimination of diversity jurisdiction counter this
with the argument that, if bias exists, it is equally present among state and federal court
judges. Hunter, a federal district judge, explains:
If a personal testimonial is permitted, it seems strange to me as one who has been a state
court judge for 13 1/2 years and one has sat on all the courts of record of his state-
trial, appellate and supreme court-that I then may have been susceptible of such
prejudice but have been purged of it for the twelve years I have been a federal judge.
Hunter, supra, at 349 n.21.
19791 FEDERA4L COURT CASELOAD
versity case a choice of federal or state forum.
Those who favor retention of diversity jurisdiction argue that be-
cause a choice of forum in diversity cases was constitutionally author-
ized and has been a part of our judicial system since 1789, it should not
be abolished summarily. 6 Proponents of elimination of diversity juris-
diction address this issue by refusing to recognize that choice of forum
is a citizen's right. 17 Instead, their approach is to characterize the fed-
eral judiciary as a "precious commodity," a "scarce resource." 18 They
advocate rationing this resource by allocating federal judicial time and
energy on a priority basis. According to their proposal, the federal ju-
diciary would hear cases that only it is authorized to hear or that it is
especially well-qualified to decide, that is, cases involving constitu-
tional issues and cases requiring decisions on questions of federal
law. 9 In diversity cases in which there is no overriding federal interest,
litigants would be limited to "one trial court to a customer" and would
be forced to litigate their claims only in state courts.2 °
Examples of plans for reallocation and realignment of federal judi-
cial resources are the two proposals introduced by advocates of elimi-
nation of diversity jurisdiction in the ninety-fifth Congress. The first
bill 2' sought to achieve reallocation and realignment of federal judicial
16. 124 CONG. REC. H1561 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman). More
practical reasons have also been offered for maintaining choice of forum: (1) a belief by
some that federal courts dispense a more professional quality of justice than state courts,
Shapiro, supra note 14, at 328-29; 124 CONG. REC. H1558 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks
of Rep. Wiggins); (2) a belief that diversity jurisdiction promotes a cross-pollination of ideas
between state and federal courts and that its abolition would result in a specialty bar,
Begam, supra note 15, at 303; Shapiro, supra note 14, at 324-26; and (3) a belief that a case
brought in federal court will result in a higher monetary recovery. 124 CONG. REC. H1560
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Sawyer).
17. Representative Kastenmeier, sponsor of the bill to eliminate diversity jurisdiction,
characterized choice of forum as "a luxury that our judicial system can no longer afford."
124 CONG. REC. H1555-56 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). That
choice of forum is a "luxury" was echoed by Representative Railsback, 124 CONG. REC.
H1556 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Railsback).
18. 123 CONG. REC. H9509 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
19. 124 CONG. REC. H1554-55 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier);
124 CONG. REC. H 1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). See statement
of former U.S. Asst. Atty. Gen. Daniel Meador, 124 CONG. REC. E3792-93 (daily ed. July
14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
20. This statement was made by former Ninth Circuit Judge Shirley Hufstedler, 123
CONG. REc. H95 10 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
21. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (as
amended). H.R. 9622 was reintroduced in the 96th Cong., 1st Sess., as H.R. 2202, 125
CONG. REC. H692 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1979). A similar bill was introduced in the Senate as S.
679, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S2875 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1979).
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resources by eliminating all diversity jurisdiction in federal courts,22
while extending federal court jurisdiction to all federal question cases,
regardless of the amount of money involved. Federal court judges thus
would be relieved of the caseload burden from diversity jurisdiction,
but would assume concurrent jurisdiction of federal question cases with
state courts. Although this bill passed the House of Representatives, it
failed to get out of committee in the Senate.
The second bill 23 proposed elimination of diversity jurisdiction only
in cases brought in federal court in the state of which the plaintiff is a
citizen. This bill would have significantly reduced the federal court
caseload.24 While acknowledging the traditional fear of prejudice
against out-of-state litigants in state courts, it would have preserved
protections against possible bias, because a resident plaintiff in a diver-
sity case has no claim of fear of local bias in his own state.
The question of whether federal diversity jurisdiction should be
abolished is a troublesome one. Elimination of any part of our federal
judicial tradition should be approached with caution. At the same
time, the federal judiciary is overburdened and fundamental ways of
reducing the judicial caseload must be found. Some of the alternative
solutions are even less satisfactory than abolishing diversity jurisdic-
tion: for example, judicial decisions that, in cases involving federal
questions and constitutional issues, restrict federal court access and that
in other cases bar access to the courts by means of the judicial doctrines
of standing and abstention. These solutions are contrary to the under-
lying premise of our judicial system that the federal courts are available
to decide important questions of federal law.25 The second proposal,
which would have eliminated diversity jurisdiction when the case is
brought by a resident plaintiff, would have best balanced the need to
relieve the federal caseload burden against the need to provide a forum
in which litigants can have their cases fairly heard. This proposal
would have retained the historical rationale of protecting against bias
toward out-of-state litigants while effecting significant reduction in the
federal caseload.
22. Alienage jurisdiction and statutory interpleader would have been retained, but the
required amount in controversy would have been increased from $10,000 to $25,000. 124
CONG. REc. H1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (as amended). Statutory impleader jurisdiction
would have been unchanged. Id
23. S. 2094, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9123, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
24. This is so because most diversity cases are filed by in-state plaintiffs. 124 CONG. REc.
H1556 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Railsback).
25. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 3 (3d ed. 1976).
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B. Omnibus Judgeship Bill
On October 20, 1978, President Carter signed the Omnibus Judge-
ship Bill,26 which created an additional 117 district and 35 circuit court
judgeships.27 This measure has been recognized as an important means
of alleviating the federal court overload by reducing the number of
cases that each judge hears.28 The problem of overcrowded dockets,
however, is caused by the increasing number of cases filed, as well as by
the per judge caseload. Therefore, since the number of judges cannot
be increased indefinitely without creating an unmanageably large judi-
ciary, more fundamental changes in the federal judiciary system are
needed in order to effect a lasting solution.
C. Magistrates
Magistrate positions were originally created in 196829 as a reform of
the United States Commissioner system. Magistrates relieve district
court judges of some of their workload by assuming jurisdiction of pre-
liminary trial proceedings and minor offenses.3 0
Although it does not address the more fundamental problem of pro-
viding a lasting solution to overcrowding, one way to increase the
number of judges available to decide cases is to expand the jurisdiction
and power of the magistrates.
The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 gave magistrates the same
power that commissioners had to hear minor offenses and preside over
preliminary trial proceedings. In addition, district judges could, at
their discretion, empower magistrates to assume a variety of additional
duties.3' Some duties include writing reports and recommendations of
disposition of prisoner petitions, conducting civil pretrial conferences,
26. Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978). This law provides for the judges to be se-
lected on the basis of merit.
27. The Ninth Circuit has been apportioned ten new circuit judges and California has
been apportioned seven additional district judges.
28. Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 3, 5 (1978) [herein-
after cited as Bell].
29. The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-637 (1976), was passed in 1968 and
became effective in 1971.
30. Puro, United States Magistrates: A4 New Federal Judicial Offcer, 2 JUST. SYS. J. 141,
143 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Puro]. The functions that magistrates perform vary widely
among the district courts. Generally, their duties have been restricted to preliminary trial
proceedings, such as issuing search or arrest warrants, conducting bail hearings, and holding
preliminary examinations. Id at 143-44.
31. Id. Magistrates may be empowered to try persons accused of minor offenses, involv-
ing a penalty of less than $1,000, imprisonment for less than a year, or both, if the defendant
consents to trial by the magistrate and waives trial by jury. Id
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reviewing motions in civil cases, and post-indictment assignments in
criminal cases.32
In the years following the statute's enactment, problems developed
that led to an inconsistency among the district courts as to the degree of
authority that magistrates should be given. The problems centered on
whether a magistrate constitutionally could be given authority to dis-
pose of civil matters.33
As a result of the uncertainty regarding the magistrates' constitu-
tional authority, it became clear that congressional action was neces-
sary to define more clearly the duties a magistrate could perform.
31
The Magistrate Act of 197935 expands the power of the magistrates by
allowing them to decide more kinds of criminal and civil cases.3 6 Ex-
pansion of magistrate jurisdiction enables them to be utilized more ef-
fectively by the district courts by allowing them to take over more of
the district judge workload.37
D. Bankruptcy Act
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197838 was enacted by Congress and
signed by President Carter on November 6, 1978. The Act will reduce
32. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 137-38.
33. Puro, supra note 30, at 151. The inconsistency arose because some of the circuits
(Sixth and Seventh Circuits) had restricted magistrates' powers to those duties specifically
enumerated in the Act that were seen as facilitating an independent decision of the district
court judge. Other circuits (primarily the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits) had held that
the magistrates' authority was limited only to the extent that their decisions were inconsis-
tent with the constitution. Id at 151, 154.
34. Id at 156.
35. Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (1979).
36. The new act upgrades the quality of the magistrates by requiring all magistrates to
have practiced law at least five years and by requiring all full-time magistrates to be certified
as qualified by the judicial council of the circuit, the standards for qualification to be
promulgated by the judicial conference. Where designated by the district courts and upon
consent of the parties, the magistrate has authority to hear civil cases; appeal of the judg-
ment to the district court is by right, with further appellate review in the circuit court or
United States Supreme Court limited to discretionary review of matters of law. The Act
provides an alternative method of appeal, if the parties consent to it: an appeal of right
directly to the circuit court of appeals.
The Magistrate Act would have increased the magistrates' authority in criminal cases,
allowing them, upon consent of the defendant, to hear any misdemeanor case, regardless of
the fine or penalty imposed. Furthermore, a defendant charged with a petty offense, less
than six months imprisonment and less than $500 fine, no longer has the option of trial by a
district court judge. For misdemeanors above the petty offense level, a defendant can have a
trial by jury before a magistrate, although the government can petition the district court to
remove complex, novel, or important cases to the district court. Id
37. Puro, supra note 30, at 143.
38. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (1979).
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the district court caseload by expanding the authority of bankruptcy
judges and by restructuring the system of appellate review. 9
Currently, a large number of bankruptcy cases, involving billions of
dollars,4" are filed each year in bankruptcy court.4 It has been antici-
pated that the number of cases filed annually will increase at a rate of
six percent per year.4' Therefore, development of an efficient means of
dealing with these cases has become necessary.
Bankruptcy cases had been heard by bankruptcy judges who had re-
stricted authority.43 Because bankruptcy judges lacked the power to
decide all the issues in bankruptcy cases, issues such as jurisdiction
were submitted to a district court judge for determination.' The Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 will relieve district court judges of this duty
by expanding the authority of bankruptcy judges to hear all the issues
in a bankruptcy case,45 thus decreasing the caseload burden of the dis-
trict court judges.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act also restructures appellate review in
bankruptcy cases.46 Formerly, bankruptcy cases were appealed to the
district court before they could be appealed to the circuit court.47 The
Bankrtiptcy Act of 1978 provides that the parties, by their agreement,
may appeal directly to the circuit courts of appeals without first appeal-
ing to the district court.48 If this route is followed by litigants, the dis-
trict court will hear fewer bankruptcy appeals, thereby decreasing its
caseload. This change in appellate review will have no effect, however,
on the caseload burden of the circuit courts.
E. Alternative Methods of Resolving Disputes
*More fundamental changes in the federal judiciary system and more
permanent solutions to the caseload problem could be effected by pro-
viding methods of resolving disputes outside of the established judicial
system. Several methods have been advocated as having the greatest
39. Id
40. 123 CONG. REc. HI 1781 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
41. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 129.
42. 123 CONG. REC. H 11772 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Railsback).
43. See Klee, The New Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 64 A.B.A.J. 1865, 1867 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Klee].
44. King, The New Bankruptcy Code: Many Improvements Over Earlier Law, Nat'l. L.J.,
Nov. 6, 1978, at 26, col. I [hereinafter cited as King].
45. Klee, supra note 43, at 1867.
46. King, supra note 44, at 26, col. 3.
47. Id
48. Id
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potential for success: (1) arbitration, 49 (2) neighborhood justice cen-
ters,50 and (3) small claims courts.51 In addition to such specific sugges-
tions for alternative means of resolving disputes, a proposal is pending
in Congress that would provide funds for research into further means
of resolving those disputes that involve small amounts of money.
2
Arbitration has been used successfully in some states as a means of
reducing congestion in state courts by resolving uncomplicated civil
disputes.53 Because of this success, the use of arbitration in the federal
court system has been proposed as an inexpensive and informal means
of encouraging prompt resolution of civil disputes. 4
During the ninety-fifth Congress, the Senate passed a bill that would
have authorized the use of arbitration panels in district courts on a
three-year experimental basis. The bill would have required the use
of arbitration panels in certain kinds of civil cases. Panels would have
been established in five to eight districts to be chosen by the Chief Jus-
tice, as well as in additional districts by local court rule. Although
cases could have been voluntarily referred to arbitration by the consent
of the parties, arbitration would have been mandatory in certain kinds
49. S. 2253, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S18068 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977).
50. Although these centers do not bear directly on the federal judiciary, they would not
only decrease the overall caseload in the state courts but would also provide all citizens with
greater access to a dispute resolution. Three neighborhood justice centers, including one in
Los Angeles, have been established on an experimental basis. The purpose of the centers is
to serve as an alternative to the courts for resolution of domestic, customer/merchant, and
landlord/tenant disputes. The centers provide an informal forum for mediation and/or ar-
bitration and therefore serve the dual purpose of relieving the courts of large numbers of
cases and of decreasing overall tension within the community by settling disputes before
they get out of hand. Bell, supra note 28, at 8; EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP., July 22, 1977, at
573. The centers are funded with federal money but are under local control.
51. Again, wider use of small claims courts has no direct bearing on the federal courts
except in the way they affect the caseload of the local courts. The purpose of these courts is
to provide a simple, inexpensive means of resolving disputes that involve small amounts of
money. For a nominal fee (usually about $6.00), a person may file a claim and arrange for
service of summons and the setting of a hearing date. No lawyers are needed to appear in
the court, and resolution is speedy and efficient. EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP., July 22, 1977,
at 574.
52. Dispute Resolution Act of 1979, S. 423, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S1411
(daily ed. Feb. 9, 1979).
53. See Comment, Compulsory JudicialArbitration in California: Reducing the Delay and
Expense of Resolving Uncomplicated Civil Disputes, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 475 (1978), for a full
discussion of compulsory arbitration in many states. This comment also points out the pos-
sible constitutional issues involved.
54. Bell, supra note 28, at 7; Bell, Improving the Justice System, 13 TRIAL, Nov. 1977, at
23, 24.
55. S. 2253, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S18068 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977) (re-
marks of Sen. Eastland).
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of civil cases.56 The rationale for requiring mandatory arbitration in
these cases is that they normally require resolution only of questions of
fact and do not require trial before a district judge.
Under the proposed arbitration legislation, the arbitration procedure
followed would have been less formal than that of a trial in district
court.5 7 After judgment by the arbitration panel is rendered, either
party would be entitled to appeal for a trial de novo in district court.
To reduce the number of cases going to district court, however, there
would be a disincentive for appeal: the party requesting the appeal
would be required to pay court costs if the award granted in district
court is less than the arbitration award.
By local court rule, three federal district courts have adopted the use
of arbitration on an experimental basis." Although results of the im-
pact of the program are not yet available, district judges involved are
optimistic that its effect will be to reduce the number of cases proceed-
ing to trial in district court. Because of the apparent success of the
program, it was thought likely that the arbitration bill will be reintro-
duced in the ninety-sixth Congress.5 9
Expanded use of arbitration in the federal courts -would effect a
double benefit. It would decrease the number of cases coming to the
district courts and, in the process, afford litigants a quicker, more infor-
mal, and less expensive means of resolving their disputes.
During the ninety-sixth Congress, another proposal was introduced,
the Dispute Resolution Act of 1979.60 This Act would establish fund-
ing for a national Dispute Resolution Resource Center, which would
research alternative out-of-court methods for resolving consumer dis-
putes and other minor conflicts.6' Such a Resource Center would serve
as a national clearinghouse for the exchange of information relating to
56. Included in this category would be the following: actions for money damages only;
actions referred in the discretion of the court; and actions for money damages of not more
than $50,000 that are Miller Act (where the United States has no monetary interest) or Jones
Act (part of the Federal Employers' Liability and Compensation Act that applies to
merchant seamen) federal question cases; contract or negotiable instrument cases brought
under federal question or diversity jurisdiction; or personal injury or property damage cases
brought under federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Id.
57. For example, discovery by the parties would be limited to 120 days. The case would
be presented to a panel of three arbiters chosen by the parties and the Federal Rules of
Evidence would not need to be followed. Id.
58. Klement, Pilot Case-Arbitration System Draws Optimismfrom U.S. Judges Involved,
Nat'l L.J., Nov. 27, 1978, at 7, col. 2.
59. Id. This, however, has not occurred as of the date of this publication.
60. See note 52 supra.
61. 125 CONG. REC. S1411 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Ford).
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nonjudicial methods of dispute resolution gathered from the states, lo-
cal communities, and the academic community.6 2 The Center would
identify those dispute resolution mechanisms most effective for general
use and would also provide assistance to state and local governments in
creating and improving various dispute resolution mechanisms. 3
The Dispute Resolution Act and arbitration proposals both provide
avenues for exploring more fundamental changes in the federal judicial
system. This could lead to a more lasting solution to the overcrowding
of federal court dockets, unlike merely increasing the number of judges
qualified to hear cases.
F National Court of Appeals
The National Court of Appeals was originally conceived as an addi-
tional federal court that would lighten the case burden of the Supreme
Court 4.6  The National Court would have decreased the number of
cases that go to the Supreme Court by screening all cases filed for certi-
orari and appeal, deciding those cases involving conflicts among the
circuits, and sending up to the Supreme Court only those cases of spe-
cial importance.6" Because the original concept was born of a need to
ease the case burden of the Supreme Court, it produced a proposal
whose main effect would have been to monitor access to the Supreme
Court 6
Although one of the principal purposes of the Supreme Court is to
provide for a consistent national law, the present system affords a na-
tional standard only for those few cases that the Supreme Court is able
62. Id at 1412.
63. Id
64. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 590
(1973).
65. Id at 611.
66. The court would be composed of seven judges appointed for life, who would sit en
banc and whose decisions would be binding on all federal courts (and also on state courts in
federal question cases). The court would have jurisdiction to hear cases referred to it by the
Supreme Court and cases transferred to it from the circuit courts of appeals, the Court of
Claims, and the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals. Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal7-rocedures Recommendations for
Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 236-47 (1975).
It was contemplated that the court would have transfer jurisdiction in the following cir-
cumstances: cases involving federal questions on which there had been inconsistent lower
court decisions; federal question cases involving recurring fact situations, in which it would
be advantageous to have a definitive determination by a national court of appeals; and cases
that involve a question of interpretation or application of a rule announced previously by
the National Court of Appeals. The court could decline to hear any case transferred to it
and such decision would not be reviewable. A National Court of Appeals decision on the
merits would be reviewable by the United States Supreme Court. Id
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to hear each year. An advantage of the original proposal is that it
would have provided for a more consistent national law by resolving
intercircuit conflicts.67 If there were an additional means of defining a
national standard, the litigation engendered by inconsistent appellate
level decisions would be eliminated. There would also have been the
added benefit of providing more answers to those important questions
that the Supreme Court currently does not have the time to consider.
The proposal for a National Court of Appeals has met with a great
deal of opposition.6" Opponents argue that by putting another level of
court between the circuit courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, an
unnecessary fourth tier in the federal court system would be created.
They further argue that it would give rise to new areas of litigation, that
it would undermine the authority of the appellate courts, that it would
cause increased delay and cost, and that, rather than decrease the
workload of the Supreme Court, it would increase it.
69
To counteract these objections, a means of providing a more consis-
tent national law has been proposed that does not encounter the same
objections as did the National Court of Appeals.70 It has been sug-
gested that a court of Patent and Trademark Appeals be formed that
would have national jurisdiction. A separate National Tax Court of
Appeals would also have national jurisdiction. These new courts
would remove from the circuit courts of appeals system two of the more
complex and technical areas of litigation, areas in which inconsistencies
are frequent.7 '
This proposal avoids most of the strongest objections to the National
Court of Appeals and has generally met with favorable opinions.
72
Rather than creating a fourth tier in the federal judiciary, it merely
gives national scope to already existing courts; the new courts also do
not attempt to limit or alter access to the Supreme Court. 3
67. Id During the 95th Congress, Rep. Charles Wiggins introduced the proposal to the
House as H.R. 3969, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. H1395 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1977).
The bill died in committee and has apparently not been reintroduced in the same form.
68. See, e.g., Larkin, Streamlining the Federal Judicial System, JUDGES J. 33 (Spring
1977); Feinberg, A National Court of Appeals?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 611 (1976).
69. Feinberg, supra note 68, at 617.
70. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 25, 1978, at 1, col. 1. The proposal was made by former Asst. Atty.
Gen. Daniel J. Meador and is substantially included as part of the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1979, S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S9133 (daily ed. July 10,
1979).
71. S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S9133 (daily ed. July 10, 1979).
72. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 25, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
73. Since it only affects indirectly the number of cases going to the Supreme Court, the
proposal does not provide the sort of National Appeals Court that Chief Justice Burger and
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The two proposals have very different goals: one attempts to ease the
Supreme Court overload and the other syphons off the number of cases
going to the circuit courts of appeals. Both would provide the benefit
of a more consistent national law.
The latest proposal would lighten the load of the circuit courts, not
indirectly by decreasing the number of cases coming into the federal
judiciary, but directly by providing a different court to hear certain
kinds of appeals. It would appear to be a vehicle that can provide relief
to the circuit courts while maintaining citizen access to the federal judi-
ciary.
These legislative proposals attempt to ease the burden on the federal
courts w'ithout denying access to litigants with federal causes of action.
That there is a need to do so is clearly shown by the judicial decisions
considered below that attempt to solve the overload problem by limit-
ing federal question access to the federal courts.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS LIMITING ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS
There is a pattern of decisions that has had the effect of limiting ac-
cess to the federal courts. For ease of exposition, the decisions that
have not evoked congressional response are discussed in this section
and the decisions to which Congress has reacted are discussed in the
following section, along with the proposed congressional solutions.
Members of the federal judiciary have exercised their decision-mak-
ing powers and discretionary authority to restrict the number and kinds
of cases heard in their courts. Some have used pretrial devices as a
means of attempting to force litigants to simplify their cases, thus
avoiding lengthy trials and use of scarce judicial resources. 74 Others
have used their discretion to remand cases to state courts by stating that
cases were removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction. ' 75 Deci-
sions by Chief Justice Warren Burger's Supreme Court have imposed
limited access to the federal courts at an earlier stage. By restrictive
concepts of standing and habeas corpus review, and by invocation of
the mootness and political question doctrines, many citizens are denied
even initial entry through the federal courthouse doors.76
Associate Justices White and Blackmun recently called for in dissents from denial of certio-
rari. See Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 (1978).
74. See, e.g., J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d
1318 (7th Cir. 1976); Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Systems, Inc., 560 F.2d 298
(7th Cir. 1977).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976). See text accompanying notes 77-89 infra.
76. See text accompanying notes 91-106 infra.
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A. Use of Pretrial Devices to Limit Access
Federal district court judges are given broad discretionary powers in
the management of the cases they hear and decide. The pretrial confer-
ence 77 is one device that district court judges can use effectively to regu-
late and simplify trials, thus allowing them to manage their large
dockets more efficiently.
JF Edwards Construction Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail
Corp. 78 is an extreme example of an attempt by a federal court judge to
cope with his case overload by using pretrial procedures to simplify
trials. When the judge did not meet with success in encouraging the
parties to agree on some issues, he tried to eliminate the trial alto-
gether.7 9 That the frustration expressed by the judge's actions may not
be uncommon is suggested in Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification
Systems, Inc. 80 In Identiseal, a district court judge dismissed a party's
pleadings for failure to prosecute, concluding that "the pretrial work
necessary to efficiently try this action had not been done."'" The appel-
late court reversed the district court rulings in these cases. It recog-
nized that, while the function of pretrial procedures is to simplify issues
for trial, thus resulting in a shortening of the trial, stipulation of facts
and issues and pretrial settlement must remain an uncoerced by-prod-
uct of pretrial procedures. As the court in JF Edwards held, settle-
ment by judicial compulsion is not one of the goals of pretrial
procedure, nor can it legitimately be one of its results.8"
Another discretionary tool available to district court judges to reduce
the size of their dockets is the use of remand to state court for cases
removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction."83 In Thermtron
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,84 Judge Hermansdorfer had re-
manded a case because he was overwhelmed with cases involving black
lung disease 5 and felt that, absent a showing of need for the case to be
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
78. 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976).
79. In .F. Edwards, the district court judge requested the parties to stipulate to a set of
provable facts to simplify issues for trial. Several pretrial conferences were held in an effort
to comply with the judge's request, but counsel for the defendant was unable or unwilling to
reach agreement with plaintifi's counsel. As a sanction against the defendant, the trial judge
struck the defendant's pleadings and cross-complaint, entering judgment for the plaintiff.
Id at 1320-21.
80. 560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. Id at 299.
82. 542 F.2d at 1325.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1976).
84. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
85. The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 dramatically increased the caseload in the East-
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heard in federal court, the interests of the parties involved would best
be served by a more expeditious trial in state court. The Supreme
Court reversed and held that a case otherwise properly removed could
not be remanded solely because the district court considers itself too
busy to hear the case.86
The problem faced in Thermtron, however, still remains unsettled.
As long as a district court purports to remand a case under section
1447(c) as "removed improvidently and without jurisdiction," 87 that or-
der is not reviewable either by appeal or writ.8" This creates a large
discretionary area for the district courts: they may remand, as Judge
Hermansdorfer did, because of an overcrowded docket, and still pre-
clude review of their decisions, as long as the language of their remand
order conforms to the requirements of section 1447(c).
Judicial discretion in management of pretrial procedures can be used
to reduce the number of cases proceeding to trial in district court, by
encouraging pretrial settlement and by deciding not to hear cases "im-
providently" removed from state court. Because district court judges
have an "inherent power . . . to manage their calendars to have an
orderly and expeditious disposition of their cases,"89 many of their de-
cisions are virtually unreviewable. Therefore, it is not known to what
extent these discretionary tools are used improperly to lessen the dis-
trict court overload by reducing the number of cases that actually pro-
ceed to trial.
B. Use of Trial Devices To Limit Access
In addition to the pretrial devices that may be used to limit access to
the federal courts, decisions of the Supreme Court have also limited
access. Although the Court's actions in some areas have prompted con-
gressional response, 90 those areas in which the Court has acted without
response from Congress include taxpayer standing to sue, federal
ern District Court of Kentucky, where Judge Hermansdorfer is a district court judge: 845
black lung cases were filed in 1975; 1723 were filed in 1976. This resulted in a caseload of
740 cases per judge, 124 CONG. REC. H724 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Maz-
zoli), which can be compared with the 1977 overall average caseload of 432 cases per judge.
See text accompanying note 6 supra.
86. 423 U.S. at 344.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1976).
88. Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723 (1977) (per curiam).
89. J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318,
1323 (7th Cir. 1976).
90. For a discussion of the legislative response to the Court's decisions in the areas of
standing, class actions, and § 1983 (Civil Rights Act) suits, see text accompanying notes 107-
78 infra.
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habeas corpus review, and invocation of the doctrines of mootness and
political question.
1. Taxpayer Standing To Sue
The Supreme Court has sought to limit access to the federal courts
by defining standing to sue91 in very narrow terms. In Frothingham v.
Mellon,92 the Court denied that a taxpayer might have standing to sue
regarding an allegedly unconstitutional expenditure. Frothingham
stands for the proposition that a federal taxpayer lacks sufficient indi-
vidualized injury to challenge the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute.93 In the 1968 case of Flast v. Cohen,94 the Court articulated an
extremely narrow exception to the general rule of Frothingham. In
Flast, the Court held that a taxpayer would only have standing to chal-
lenge the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power and
only if "the challenged enactment exceed[ed] specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and
spending power and not simply that the enactment [was] generally be-
yond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8."'' In addition,
the Court required that the taxpayer point to a provision in the Consti-
tution that specifically limits the taxing and spending power. The
Court could only identify one such provision, the first amendment.
96
In two subsequent decisions, United States v. Richardson97 and
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,98 the Supreme
Court demonstrated that it did not intend to expand taxpayer standing.
In both Richardson and Schlesinger, the Court limited taxpayer stand-
ing to challenges based on article I, section 8 of the Constitution.
Thus, the Court has effectively curtailed the possibility that a tax-
payer might have standing to sue because of his or her status as a tax-
payer.
2. Federal Habeas Corpus Review
The jurisdiction of federal courts to review state prisoners' convic-
tions by use of the writ of habeas corpus is founded upon a federal
91. Id
92. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
93. Id at 488.
94. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
95. Id at 102-03.
96. Id. at 105.
97. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
98. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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statute, namely, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.9 9 Since the Warren Court held that
the exclusionary rule for unconstitutionally seized evidence was appli-
cable to the states,"° the scope of habeas corpus relief has been ex-
panded to allow review of state prisoners' convictions when those
convictions are based on illegally seized evidence. In Kaufman v.
United States,l"' the Supreme Court rejected the position of a majority
of the circuit courts of appeals, who had denied habeas corpus relief to
state prisoners asserting violation of their fourth amendment rights.
The Court stated that the purpose of the federal habeas corpus remedy
was not to further the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule but
was to "insure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial where
constitutional rights are at stake."' 2
In Stone v. Powell, °3 the Supreme Court rejected this rationale as a
misinterpretation of the scope of section 2254. Instead, the Court held
that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair liti-
gation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not re-
quire that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial.' ' 04 The effect of this decision has
been to limit substantially the remedies available to a state prisoner
whose fourth amendment rights may have been violated. Because it
has eliminated federal habeas corpus review as a remedy for many
state prisoners who previously would have sought to redress their
wrongs in federal court, it has thus reduced the number of cases coming
into federal court.
3. Mootness
Traditionally, the federal courts have sought to manage their dockets
by limiting the kinds of cases they will review. Although not constitu-
tionally mandated, these limitations have been Rdhered to for many
years. For instance, the courts will not consider issues that have be-
come moot. Thus, a minor suing for the right to be served beer will
have no standing when he reaches the age of majority because the issue
will have become moot as to him.'05 The rationale behind requiring
that the issues in the case not be moot is that a case can only be effec-
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
100. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
101. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
102. Id at 225.
103. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
104. Id at 482 (footnote omitted).
105. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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tively litigated if the parties are truly adverse, that is, if they have an
interest in the outcome of the litigation. To do otherwise would have
the effect of allowing the Court to give advisory opinions, which would
violate the dictates of the Constitution.
0 6
IV. LEGISLATIVE REACTION TO JUDICIAL DECISIONS RESTRICTING
ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS
Although the judicial decisions cited in the previous section have ef-
fectively limited access to the federal courts, they have not evoked con-
gressional response. However, in the areas of standing, class actions,
and civil rights, Congress has found the Court's decisions so restrictive
of necessary citizen access to federal courts that it has responded with
proposals to restore access in these areas.
A. Standing To Sue
The standing doctrine is based in part on the constitutional provision
that requires that those matters heard by the courts be "cases" and
,*'controversies."' °7 In Warth v. Seldin, the Supreme Court termed this
the "minimum constitutional mandate."'0 s As such, it cannot be al-
tered by Congress. The Court has indicated that the case and contro-
versy clause requires that a plaintiff allege "'such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy' to warrant his invocation of federal
court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf."' 0 9
But another aspect of the standing doctrine has developed over the
years. It is based on a judicial policy to control the kinds and numbers
of cases that the federal courts will hear. It is this policy or prudential
aspect of the standing requirement that can be addressed by Con-
gress. 'l0
The combined reading of the constitutional minimum and prudential
standing requirements has produced the following criteria to determine
standing:II (1) the party seeking relief must have suffered some actual
injury; (2) the injury must have been caused by the action being chal-
106. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Other cases traditionally avoided by the federal courts
are those believed to involve political questions. Such cases involve issues that are more
appropriately left to the legislature to resolve.
107. Id.
108. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
109. Id at 498-99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
110. 124 CONG. REc. E3778 (daily ed. July 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
11l. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166 (1974); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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lenged; (3) the injury alleged must be one that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable judgment; (4) the right asserted must belong to the par-
ticular litigant before the court; and (5) the interest asserted must be
within the zone of interest intended to be protected by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question.
A number of recent decisions have denied standing to litigants on
three broad grounds: (1) that the injury alleged is a "generalized griev-
ance" such that the litigant has no more interest in the outcome than
does the public at large;" 2 (2) that the allegedly invalid statute is not
the primary cause of the injury;" 3 and (3) that the injury will not be
completely redressed by a favorable decision." 4 To the extent that
these decisions are based on policy and not on constitutional grounds,
they have met with opposition. Critics have contended that the deci-
sions appear to be based on political and not policy grounds."'
A change in restrictive standing requirements has been recognized as
one of the goals of the Carter administration." 6 There has been a feel-
ing that the Burger Court's decisions unwarrantedly deny access to citi-
zens who seek to challenge governmental action in the federal courts.7
For this reason, legislation has been introduced18 to counter those
technical barriers created by the Court.
The congressional bill enunciated three reasons and policies behind
the bill: (1) members of the public should have access to the federal
courts to redress governmental wrongs even if many members of the
public are affected equally; (2) unduly restrictive standing requirements
have prevented resolution of meritorious lawsuits; and (3) judicial en-
ergy and resources are more efficiently spent deciding cases than con-
sidering complicated standing requirements.' 19
Specifically, the Act would be applicable in civil actions against gov-
112. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
113. See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975).
114. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
115. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518-20 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Address by President Carter before the Los Angeles Bar Association (May 1978),
reprinted in L.A. LAW. 15, 42 (June 1978).
117. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. S2821 (daily ed. March 15, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Met-
zenbaum).
118. Citizens' Right to Standing in Federal Courts Act, S. 680, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. Rac. S2822 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1979). See also 125 CONG. REC. S2822-25 (daily ed.
Mar. 15, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
119. Id at S2823.
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ermments, their agencies, or their officials. While the act does not alter
taxpayer standing, broadly stated it does provide that a federal court
may not dismiss a plaintiffs action for lack of standing on any of four
grounds: (1) that the injury complained of is a generalized grievance;
(2) that defendant's conduct is not the primary cause of plaintiffs in-
jury; (3) that a favorable decision on the merits is not substantially
likely to remedy plaintiffs injury; or (4) that the plaintiffs injury is not
within the "zone of interests" regulated by the statute in question. It is
believed that these four areas do not come within the constitutional
minimum required for standing and that, therefore, Congress has the
right to act.' 20
It is hoped that the legislation will effect two results. First, it is ex-
pected that a broader range of issues involving allegedly illegal govern-
mental action will be presented in federal court. Second, the bill would
clear up the present confusion about standing, providing more cer-
tainty, which would in turn allow the courts to focus their energies on
the resolution of disputes rather than standing issues.1
2 '
It can be seen from the discussion accompanying the introduction of
the bill and the analysis of the bill conducted by the Justice Depart-
ment that its purpose is to react specifically to a developing restrictive
standing doctrine. In fact, Senator Kennedy went one step further and
suggested that Congress ought to act to require that the invocation of
the standing doctrine be limited to the strict constitutional minimum
requirements.
22
There is a feeling in Congress that, although this measure will in-
crease the workload of the federal courts, it is more important that
120. Id.
121. Id. When a similar bill was introduced in the 95th Congress, Asst. U.S. Atty. Gen.
Patricia M. Wald presented to Congress a Justice Department staff memorandum which
analyzed the potential effect of the legislation on several of the leading standing cases. 124
CONG. REC. S6498, S6499-01 (daily ed. April 27, 1978). The seven leading cases discussed
were Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973); Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1976); and Scodari v. Alexan-
der, 69 F.R.D. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). The analysis concluded that had the act been in effect
at the time these cases were decided, three of them (Warth, Schlesinger, and Linda AS.)
would have been decided differently; two of the cases (Richardson and Public Citizen) Would
be unaffected, since they involved taxpayer standing; and the remaining two (Simon and
Scodari) would eliminate only one of the grounds relied on by the court to deny standing,
lack of standing to assert the rights of third parties would remain unaffected. 124 CONG.
REC. S6500-01 (daily ed. April 27, 1978) (letter from Asst. U.S. Atty. Gen. Patricia M.
Wald).
122. 125 CONG. REC. S2823 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
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"[i]ndividuals who have been victimized by unlawful governmental ac-
tion. . . have access to the courts."'' 23 Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dis-
senting opinion in Warth, pointed to the seriousness of limiting access
to the courts, particularly in a case like Warth, which involved discrim-
inatory zoning:
Standing has become a barrier to access to the federal courts, just as "the
political question" was in earlier decades. The mounting caseload of fed-
eral courts is well known. But cases such as this one reflect festering sores
in our society; and the American dream teaches that if one reaches high
enough and persists there is a forum where justice is dispensed. I would
lower the technical barriers and let the courts serve that ancient need.
124
B. Class Actions
In the twelve years since class actions were reformed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, there has been much controversy over the
use of class actions because of difficulties of judicial management of
these cases, the high cost to plaintiffs, and the risk of great financial
liability to defendants.
Decisions by the Supreme Court construing jurisdictional amount re-
quirements for diversity cases brought in federal court and interpreting
the notice requirements of rule 23(b)3 have had the effect of limiting
the number and kinds of class actions that may be heard in federal
court. As a response to these judicial decisions and the widespread dis-
satisfaction voiced by the judicial, academic, and practicing legal com-
munities, several measures have been introduced in Congress that
would significantly alter rule 23(b)3.
In Snyder v. Harris,'25 the Supreme Court considered the question of
whether separate and distinct claims presented by claimants in a class
action could be aggregated to meet the required $10,000 amount in
controversy.' 26 It did so in order to resolve an inconsistency among the
circuit courts of appeals as to whether the amendments to rule 23,127
123. 124 CONG. REc. E3777-78 (daily ed. July 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
124. 422 U.S. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
126. A minimum amount in controversy of $10,000 is required in diversity cases. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). In Snyder, the Court rejected the class plaintiffs' contentions that the
"matter in controversy" should encompass the claims of the entire class. The Court instead
took the position that the class action device was merely one of permissive joinder, and that,
as with other joinder provisions, plaintiffs could not add together the amounts of their claims
in order to meet the jurisdictional amount requirements, where those claims were separate
and distinct.
127. Under the old rule 23, class actions were classified as true, hybrid, or spurious.
Under "true" class actions, when the interests of the parties were common and undivided,
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which abolished the distinctions between "true" and "spurious" class
actions, now required aggregation of claims in all class actions. The
Court did not base its decision on an interpretation of rule 23; instead,
it decided that the ability to aggregate claims depended on the Court's
previous interpretations of the statutory phrase "matter in contro-
versy." 2 8 Although the Court recognized the validity of the contention
that its decision might "prevent some important questions from being
litigated in federal courts,"' 29 it claimed that it was more important to
further the congressional purpose of using the jurisdictional amount
requirement to check "the rising caseload of the federal courts . . .
[since] [t]he expansion of the federal caseload could be most noticeable
in class actions brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship."'
' 30
In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 13 the Burger Court used the
$10,000 amount in controversy requirement to limit the use of class
actions further. 32 The Court dismissed the action as to most of the
plaintiffs, expanding Snyder to require that each plaintiff member of
the class in a rule 23(b)3 class action must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount, and that those who do not must be dismissed from the case.
133
Snyder and Zahn reflect an intentional decision by the Supreme
Court to use the jurisdictional amount requirement as a vehicle for lim-
iting class actions in federal courts. Either case could have appropri-
ately reached an opposite result, had the Court chosen to base its
decision on other well-developed judicial doctrines. In Snyder, "matter
in controversy" could have been recognized as encompassing the
claims of the whole class; in Zahn, the Court could have applied the
concept of ancillary jurisdiction to allow the federal courts to hear
those claims that did not meet the requisite $10,000 amount, as long as
the representative plaintiffs did meet the requirement. Instead, the
aggregation was permitted. Under "spurious" class actions, a form of permissive joinder,
each plaintiff was required to meet the jurisdictional amount requirements. The 1966
amendments to rule 23 eliminated the categories of true, hybrid, and spurious and separated
class actions functionally. The Tenth Circuit had held that elimination of the distinction
required aggregation of claims in all class actions, whereas the Fifth and Eighth Circuits had
held that it did not. 394 U.S. at 335-36.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
129. 394 U.S. at 338.
130. Id at 340.
131. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
132. In Zahn, representative plaintiffs brought an action based on diversity jurisdiction
on behalf of themselves and 200 other property owners with lake-front property on Lake
Champlain. They sought damages for the decrease in utility and value of their land result-
ing from the defendant's continued pollution from its pulp and paper-making plant. Each
of the named representative plaintiffs met the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement.
133. 414 U.S. at 300.
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Court utilized these cases further to restrict access to federal courts in
class actions.1
34
The Supreme Court placed an even heavier burden on class action
plaintiffs in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.'35 In Eisen, the Court held
that rule 23(c)2 requires that individual notice of the action be pro-
vided to those members of the class who are identifiable through rea-
sonable effort. When the class is composed of many members, meeting
this requirement can be prohibitively expensive. If the cost of notice is
so high that the plaintiff cannot afford to bear it, the action cannot pro-
ceed as a class action.
The imposition of such a great financial burden on the representative
plaintiff136 is an unfortunate means of limiting the federal court access
of plaintiffs who may have claims worthy of adjudication. This limita-
tion, in conjunction with the jurisdictional amount limitations, has er-
ected a substantial barrier to the use of federal class actions as a means
of seeking judicial relief. Because large class actions frequently entail
complex, multidistrict litigation, denial of the federal forum may result
in denial of an adequate remedy.
The need for reform of federal class action procedures has been rec-
ognized by the federal judiciary, practitioners involved in class action
litigation, and the academic legal community. 137 Examples of possible
reform are two proposals that were introduced in Congress. The first
would have substantially modified rule 23;138 the second would have
abolished rule 23, replacing it with a new class action structure.'
39
The Citizens' Access to the Courts Act of 1978 would have signifi-
134. This position was reaffirmed recently by the Court in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978), where it held that the defendant could not be required to
compile the list of members of the class to whom notice must be given. As a general rule,
since the representative plaintiff seeks to maintain the suit as a class action, he must perform
and pay for the tasks necessary to give notice to the class. Id at 356. However, the Court
did recognize an exception to this general rule: When a defendant in a class action can
perform one of the tasks necessary to send notice more efficiently than the representative
plaintiff, the district court has the discretion to order him to do so. Id The district court also
has limited discretion in allocating the cost of complying with its order. Id at 358.
135. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
136. In Eisen, cost of notice was estimated at over $200,000. 124 CONG. REc. S33 (daily
ed. Jan. 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
137. Responses to the Rule 23 Questionnaire of the 4dvisory Committee on Civil Ru/es, 5
CLASS AcT. REP. 1 (1978). In a recent survey, many federal district judges expressed their
beliefs that rule 23 wastes judicial resources through cumbersome, expensive, and time-con-
suming procedures, and that rule 23 should be amended to improve this problem. Id at 17.
138. Citizens' Access to the Courts Act of 1978, S. 2390, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.
REc. 533 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978).
139. Reform of Class Action Litigation Procedures, S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124
CONG. REC. S14501 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978).
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cantly amended rule 23 as it now exists. 4 ' It would have counteracted
the Supreme Court's decisions in Snyder and Zahn by allowing class
action plaintiffs to aggregate their claims; each individual plaintiff
would be required, however, to have at least a twenty-five dollar claim.
The heavy financial burden of notice imposed upon the plaintiff in El-
sen would also have been ameliorated; in rule 23(b)3 actions, only a
reasonable notice would be required. The trial judge would have had
flexibility in determining what is reasonable in each case, depending on
the cost of notice, the resources of the parties, and the likelihood of
represented members wanting to opt out. The court also would have
had discretionary power to apportion the cost of notice in proportion to
each party's likelihood of prevailing in the action. The result of this
bill would have been to eliminate the restrictions on class actions that
were effected by the Supreme Court in Snyder, Zahn, and Eisen.
A second proposal would have effected more fundamental reform by
repealing rule 23 altogether, and replacing it with two new procedures:
the "public" class action and the "compensatory" class action. 4 ' The
primary purpose of the "public" class action would be to deter frauds
perpetrated on large numbers of people in comparatively small dollar
amounts. In such situations, it is not economically feasible for an indi-
vidual to bring the action alone. 142 The purpose of the "compensatory"
class action is to provide a means of compensating individuals who
have suffered more substantial economic injury. 43 These goals would
be effected by new definitions of class membership and class action
procedures. 144
These legislative proposals would alleviate some of the problems in-
140. See note 138 supra.
141. See note 139 supra.
142. 124 CoNG. Ruc. S14502 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
143. Id
144. The public class action would not be a class action in the traditional sense. Rather, it
would be a procedure for litigating a single collective claim in the name of the United States.
It would require a class of at least 200 people who had suffered damages of less than $300
each, but whose combined damages were greater than $60,000. The injuries must arise from
the same transaction or occurrence and present at least one substantial common question of
law or fact. No prejudgment notice would be required, because the claim would be vested in
the United States.
For the compensatory class action, a class of at least 40 people would be required, with
each claimant having an injury exceeding $300. As in the public class action, each injury
must arise from the same transaction or occurrence and present a common question of law
or fact. Notice that is reasonably necessary to ensure adequacy of representation and fair-
ness would be required. Restrictive use of discovery and a prompt preliminary hearing to
determine class certification would result in a more manageable class action device than that
available under rule 23. Its requirements are more stringent than the public class action,
based on the premise that people injured in amounts greater than $300 have sufficient incen-
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herent in class actions. At the same time, they would restore the federal
courts as a forum for class action suits.
C Civil Rights Improvement Act
A large number of decisions restricting access to federal court have
involved cases brought under section 1983 of the United States
Code. 145 In the wake of the Civil War, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was
enacted to provide "a remedy where state law was inadequate" and "a
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was
not available in practice."'' 46 As a result of early restrictive judicial in-
terpretations, the Civil Rights Act did not fulfill the original congres-
sional intent and remained largely unused as a remedy until the 1950's
and the beginning of the civil rights movement. The Warren Court
effected a realignment of the balance of federal and state court litiga-
tion of federal constitutional rights, recognizing that federal courts are
the proper place to redress the violation of federal constitutional rights.
The more recent Burger Court, with its emphasis on federalism, has
used a number of judicial doctrines as rationales for restricting access
to the federal courts in section 1983 cases. Congress, responding to
what it considered to be "certain earlier Supreme Court rulings that
have seriously curtailed access to federal courts for civil rights liti-
gants,"' 147 is considering a bill, the Civil Rights Improvement Act of
1979, 148 the purpose of which is to "insure the continued vitality of
section 1983." '
49
The bill would amend section 1983 by: (1) providing that states, mu-
nicipalities, and other local government entities are "persons" for the
purpose of section 1983;150 (2) defining the circumstances under which
states and local governments will be liable for actions of their employ-
ees and agents in section 1983 suits;' 5' (3) limiting the doctrine of
Younger v. Harris"52 to criminal proceedings; 53 (4) prohibiting the use
of the abstention doctrine in section 1983 suits; '14 and (5) protecting
tive to retain counsel and maintain their action as a class. Id at S14501. See also Meador,
Proposed Revision of Class Damage Procedures, 65 A.B.A.J. 48 (1979).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). This is the codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
146. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).
147. 125 CONG. REC. S15992 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
148. Id. at S15994.
149. Id. at S15992 (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
150. Id. at S15994.
151. Id.
152. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
153. 125 CONG. REC. S15994-95.
154. Id. at S15994.
[Vol. 121026
FEDERAL COURT CASELOAD
suits brought under section 1983 from the possibility that a federal
court might require exhaustion of state judicial proceedings before
hearing the case 55 or apply res judicata principles to a state decision of
the section 1983 case.
1 56
1. Definition of Persons
By interpreting the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
the Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services 57 held
that municipalities are "persons" for section 1983 cases. This position
overruled earlier decisions by the Court in Monroe v. Pape5 8 and Ke-
nosha v. Bruno,'5 9 which excluded municipalities from the section 1983
definition of "persons." The Court refused, however, to extend the def-
inition of "person" to include states in Quern v. Jordan.'
60
2. Governmental Immunity
Although the Court in Monell abrogated the absolute immunity of
local governments from section 1983 suits, definition of the limits of
governmental liability must occur on a case by case basis. By delineat-
ing these limits in congressional action, governmental liability would
be more clearly defined and governments would have notice of poten-
tial liability. '
6
3. The Younger Doctrine
One of the principal ways in which decisions of the Burger Court
have denied citizens' access to federal courts is the expansive use of the
Younger doctrine. Absent a showing of bad faith enforcement or other
special circumstances, the Younger doctrine requires that principles of
equity, comity, and federalism preclude a federal court from enjoining
an ongoing state criminal proceeding.' 62 Since the initial articulation
of the Younger doctrine, the Court has extended it to include: (1) state
criminal proceedings begun after a complaint in federal court has been
filed, but before any federal proceedings of substance on the merits
have taken place; 63 (2) completed state proceedings, the period for ap-
155. Id. at S15994-95.
156. Id. at S15995.
157. 436 U.S. 663, 701 (1978).
158. 365 U.S. 167 (1979).
159. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
160. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
161. 125 CONG. REC. at S15994.
162. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).
163. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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peal of which has not yet elapsed at the time of the filing of the federal
suit, even though there may have been no intent to appeal; 64 (3) state
civil cases;165 and (4) contempt proceedings. 66 It is feared that the
Court will continue to extend the doctrine.
67
Typical of the criticism of the broadening scope of the Younger doc-
trine is Justice Brennan's dissent in luidice v. Vail:
It stands the § 1983 remedy on its head to deny the § 1983 plaintiff access
to the federal forum because of the pendency of state civil proceedings
where Congress intended that the district court should entertain his suit
without regard to the pendency of the state suit. Rather than furthering
principles of comity and our federalism, forced federal abdication in this
context undercuts one of the chief values of federalism-the protection
and vindication of important and overriding federal civil rights, which
Congress, in § 1983 and the Judiciary Act of 1875, ordained should be a
primary responsibility of the federal courts.'
68
4. Abstention
The judicially created abstention doctrine was formulated by the
Court in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.' 69 As first articulated,
the doctrine was founded on the principle that federal courts should
delay their decision when a federal constitutional claim is based on an
unsettled question of state law. The rationale behind the doctrine was
that a federal court, by first allowing the states to settle the underlying
question of state law, would be able to avoid unnecessarily deciding a
constitutional question. In 1959, in Harrison v. NAACP, 70 the Court
expanded the doctrine to apply in section 1983 cases. The Court again
applied the doctrine in a section 1983 case in Boehnig v. Indiana State
Employees' Association. '
7'
There has been widespread criticism of the use of abstention in sec-
tion 1983 cases. As early as the first use of the doctrine in such cases,
164. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
165. Id.
166. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
167. Greenhouse, Texas Case May Advance U.S. Abstention Doctrine, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 13,
1978, at 5, col. 1. Indeed, the Court has done so in Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). In
Moore, the Court held that the Younger doctrine applied to a state civil suit involving the
temporary removal of a child from the custody of its parents under child abuse statutes. The
Court based its holding upon its findings that the state was a party to the proceedings and
that the proceeding itself was based on a statute "'in aid of and closely related to criminal
statutes'." Id. at 2377 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
168. 430 U.S. 327, 343-44 (1977).
169. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
170. 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
171. 423 U.S. 6 (1975).
1028 [Vol. 12
FEDERAL COURT CASELOAD
Justice Douglas articulated the view that "[w]e need not-we should
not-give deference to a state policy that seeks to undermine para-
mount federal law. We fail to perform the duty expressly enjoined by
Congress on the federal judiciary in the Civil Rights Acts when we do
so.72 In response to this criticism, the Civil Rights Improvement Act
would have prohibited the use of the abstention doctrine in section
1983 suits.'
73
5. Exhaustion of State Judicial Remedies
In Monroe v. Pape,'74 the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of state judicial remedies was not applicable to section 1983
suits. Although thus far there have been no decisions altering this
holding, it is feared that, in light of other judicial decisions readjusting
the balance between state and federal courts, the Burger Court may
attempt to erode or reverse the exhaustion rule of Monroe.1
75
As a preventive measure, the Senate bill would have codified the
Monroe holding by providing that no court could dismiss any civil ac-
tion brought under section 1983 on the ground that the plaintiff failed
to exhaust his or her state judicial remedies.'
76
6. Res Judicata
Because the nature and purpose of section 1983 is to provide a fed-
eral remedy for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights,
it would seem antithetical to apply res judicata to state decisions of
section 1983 claims. The Supreme Court has not decided the applica-
bility of res judicata principles to section 1983 suits. It is feared, how-
ever, that the Court may be heading in that direction, and in light of its
present restrictive policy, such a decision would effectively shut off ac-
cess to a federal forum altogether in section 1983 suits.'
77
The Senate proposal anticipated this by providing that federal courts
would not be barred from hearing section 1983 suits previously liti-
gated in state courts. However, it would have limited the kind of relief
that a federal court could have granted in such circumstances to the
172. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 184 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
173. 125 CONG. REC. at S 15994.
174. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 663 (1978).
175. This fear was expressed by Senator Mathias when a similar bill was introduced in
the 95th Congress. 123 CONG. REC. S203 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Ma-
thias).
176. 125 CONG. REC. at S 15994-95.
177. See note 175 supra, at S204.
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following-: invalidation or setting aside of a criminal conviction, modi-
fication or setting aside of an order with respect to damages, and modi-
fication or setting aside of an order related to conduct determined not
to be covered under section 1983.178
The current majority on the Supreme Court has sought to emphasize
federalism by shifting some federal question cases to state courts. The
rationale has been that state courts are just as qualified as federal courts
to decide federal question cases. However, the purpose of the Civil
Rights Act was to provide a federal forum for cases in which it was
assumed that litigants would not get a fair hearing in the state courts.
Therefore, to deny access to the federal courts in these cases is to defeat
the express purpose of the Act.
The cumulative effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in these areas
has been an erosion of the rights of citizens to have their federal ques-
tion cases decided in the federal courts. Congress has appropriately
responded by seeking to restore access to these federal courts. Congress
has realized that, although there is a need to decrease the number of
cases heard in federal courts, federal rights should not be sacrificed to
achieve this result.
V. CONCLUSION
While Congress has recognized the need to reduce the federal court
caseload, it has also realized the necessity of maintaining litigant access
to federal courts in cases involving important federal questions. Con-
gress has adopted a two-pronged attack to reallocate federal judicial
resources. First, legislation has been introduced that would ease the
caseload burden in the federal courts by: (1) increasing the numbers
and types of judges and magistrates, (2) removing some cases from the
judicial system altogether, and (3) shifting diversity cases to state
courts. In addition, a proposal for a National Court of Appeals would
reduce the caseload of the circuit courts of appeals by giving certain
kinds of federal courts national appellate jurisdiction. Second, Con-
gress has responded to judicially imposed technical restrictions of ac-
cess to federal courts with proposals tailored specifically to counteract
their effect.
It is apparent that the federal judiciary is quickly reaching the upper
limits of its capacity to hear and decide all the cases that it is currently
empowered to hear. It is equally apparent, therefore, that it is neces-
sary to provide some means of reducing the federal court caseload. It is
178. Id.
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imperative, however, that in doing so federal rights are not abridged.
Several of the recent Supreme Court decisions have, in the name of
federalism, shifted cases from federal to state court. It can be argued
that, in some classes of cases, denial of the federal forum is tantamount
to denial of a federal right. Therefore, it is necessary to balance the
need to reduce the federal court overload against the need to preserve
access to the federal courts when federal rights are in jeopardy.
Of the legislative proposals meant to reduce the caseload burden,
only those dealing with diversity eliminate a currently existing right of
access to a federal court. In view of the apparent alternative of denying
access in some federal question cases, elimination from the federal
courts of at least some of the diversity cases appears to be the lesser of
two evils. Furthermore, if the heavy federal caseload is the factor moti-
vating the Supreme Court to decide cases in a way that keeps cases out
of federal court, perhaps the elimination of a large number of diversity
cases will have the effect of reducing these kinds of decisions by the
court.
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